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Abstract 
When people use electronic media for their communication, Computer-Mediated 
Communication (CMC) theories describe the social and communicative aspects of people’s 
interpersonal transactions. When people interact via a remote-controlled robot, many of the 
CMC theses hold. Yet, what if people communicate with a conversation robot that is (partly) 
autonomous? Do the same theories apply? This paper discusses CMC theories in 
confrontation with observations and research data gained from human-robot communication. 
As a result, I argue for an addition to CMC theorizing when the robot as a medium itself 
becomes the communication partner. In view of the rise of social robots in coming years, I 
define the theoretical precepts of a possible next step in CMC, which I elaborate in a second 
paper. 
Introduction 
Currently, the development and application of social robots in real-life settings rapidly 
increases. Whereas robots initially were the domain of science-fiction, today, social robots 
are tried out in service-oriented professions in healthcare, education, and commerce 
(Broadbent, 2017). Habitually, general-purpose robots are readied for a particular task in a 
particular environment such as guidance through an exhibition or reception in a hotel 
(Broadbent, 2017). 
To date, social robots usually are studied from the angle of care, education, hospitality or 
from the side of technology. That basically is a case-by-case approach. Even the review 
articles (e.g., Broadbent, 2017), excellent in their own right, group robots on particular 
application domains or technologies. In my view, this is not the potential of social robotics. 
They are a novel, human-created communication entity, playing their own social role, with 
their own style of interpersonal communication: human-like, but non-human. Those qualities 
will come to full expression once people realize that all application domains will become part 
of one worldwide Internet of Things (IoT), Cloud, or other data technology that regular users 
cannot handle any more information-wise. But the robot can (Hoorn, 2018b). Therefore, 
social robots should be placed in the context of advancing data technology because the robot 
is our only analogue link to an otherwise completely digitized world of information. 
Therefore, the importance of social robots may increase still in view of the development of 
Cloud computing and IoT, as an intermediary between the digital and analogue world. And 
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this is where communication design and communication science can make a valuable 
contribution. 
Household appliances are increasingly equipped with embedded software. There are smart 
thermostats controlling home temperature, CO2 measurement devices, and pillboxes that 
administer medicine intake. Devices and apps each have their own interfaces: buttons, bars, 
charts, beeps, blinks. This IoT sends data to the Cloud, where they are analyzed, usage 
patterns identified, and returned to the user. This feedback at a given point is so massive that 
valuable signals and recommendations are ignored. 
Communication is where social robots can play a major role. Social robots evoke strong 
affective responses in human beings, which CO2 devices and thermostats do not do. It is more 
likely that people take their medication when the robot tells them to than when their pillbox 
blinks a light. Someday, social robots may physically accompany the user as the interface 
between cloud computing, data analytics, and embedded software on the one hand and the 
analogue world of human communication on the other (Hoorn, 2018b). 
Therefore, Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) will probably grow in the direction of designing 
natural communication between the digital and the human world. There are plenty of HRI 
studies into communication with the aim to improve the interaction between human and robot 
(e.g., Kim, Sur, & Gong, 2009). Yet, HRI mainly works from practical considerations and 
may apply but hardly develops communication theory. HRI does not have that obligation 
because Gunkel (2012) already noted that Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) may 
take that role. However, Gunkel (2012) also notices that CMC focuses on communication and 
interpersonal relationships with real people rather than with artificial, non-human beings. 
This is the area of Media Psychology (M), which covers topics as diverse as narrative 
immersion, presence, reality perception, and moral conflicts related to media fare. I will focus 
on M explanations of how people become attached to or detached from avatars, movie and 
game characters, as well as social robots. 
CMC theorizes about the communication aspects of using various media but CMC is not 
engaged with robots. CMC envisions media as channels of information exchange. Walther, 
Van der Heide, Ramirez, Burgoon, and Peña (2015), for example, state that early CMC 
believed that technology would restrict the social and emotional quality of communication. 
Sundar, Jia, Waddell, and Huang (2015) confirm that initially, CMC saw machines as 
deficient compared to face-to-face communications but that later approaches emphasized user 
adaptation and uniquely media-related communicative features (e.g., emoticons). 
HRI is directed at fixing the problems CMC observes and formulates interaction theory that is 
case-based rather than general. HRI is concerned with the question how humans and 
machines interact. Where are the borders and how do we optimize our “technologized 
relationships?” (McDowell & Gunkel, 2016, p. 2). HRI assumes that the human mind cannot 
follow the machine and tries to make sense of machine behavior in human terms (Guzman, 
2016). 
M studies the bond someone may feel with the representation of a human (a depiction, a 
rendering) and focuses on the psychology of mediated communication. Users may affectively 
become attached to media characters (e.g., TV interviewers or soap characters). The way they 
relate to machinery (a mere channel, ‘another human being,’ or mixes thereof) directs the 
way they communicate (Konijn & Hoorn, 2017). If the robot is regarded more as socially 
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similar to a human being (not necessarily completely), theories such as Media Equation and 
Computers As Social Actors come into operation (e.g., Nass & Moon, 2000), stating that 
humans treat media the same way as they do humans. If robots are regarded more as 
dissimilar to humans (although not completely), there is actually no systematic 
communication theory available, which is the deficit the current paper wishes to fix. 
To arrive at a systematic theory of robot communication, the current paper provides a 
synthetic review, critique, and application of CMC theory and research. I will synthesize 
CMC theories, extract principles, propositions, and results, and extend these to the 
communicative aspects of robotics. Where CMC falls short, I will devise new theoretical 
formulations. 
In Hoorn (2018a), I will go deeper into the psychological consequences of the different robot 
communications for the relationship someone may develop with a machine up to the stage of 
becoming friends. Hoorn (2018a) does not discuss how robots and humans may become each 
other’s adversaries, the central plot device of many science-fiction stories. 
The next section outlines a fundamental difference between two modes of processing robot 
communication. One is the robot seen as a means to transmit messages between a sender and 
a receiver. Here, the robot is regarded as a communication device with a human as the source 
of the message. The other is that the robot itself is assumed the sender of the message, 
regarding the robot as communication partner and autonomous source. This division is 
independent of unidirectional or multidirectional communication and counts for monologues 
and turn-taking interactions alike. 
Robot Design and User Perception 
There are two ways of operating a communication robot: in remote control or with 
autonomous software, typically Artificial Intelligence (AI). In remote control, the person who 
handles the robot is the ‘roboteer’ who types in texts that are rendered by the robot in speech 
and gestures; an acted-out chat session so to speak. An example is Softbank’s Nao with Zora 
software installed, which therapists use to exercise with older adults. This form of 
communication is via a robot rather than with a robot. 
When a robot is equipped with AI, a human converses with an intelligent system embodied 
by sensors and actuators. A simple example is a chat bot and its embodied version would be 
Hanson Robotics Sophia. Deep neural networks, a kind of AI, let Sophia track and recognize 
faces and do movements. The neural nets are dynamically integrated with Sophia’s dialogue 
decision trees, so that for the user it feels as if the robot ‘understands’ the conversation. 
Scientifically, the idea is to model the robot after the human system (‘emulation’) so to 
understand what we do not know about human communication yet. 
Of course, mixes exist as well and sometimes researchers use a remote-controlled robot in a 
Wizard of Oz (WOz) set-up to find out what users want from a robot without coding a full-
sized AI. Hiroshi Ishiguro’s Erica is a case in point, where users think they talk to an 
autonomous machine but in the back (literally behind the curtain), a roboteer handles the 
speech and movements. An actor impersonating a robot in a movie follows the same idea. 
Rather than emulation, all kinds of artistic and engineering tricks establish the suggestion of 
speaking to an autonomous system. The suggestion paradigm is easier put to practice than 
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emulation but theoretically, it forwards interesting questions on social perception, (false) 
attributions, and ethical conduct. 
How users perceive remote-controlled robots, AI-machines, or WOz arrangements is a 
completely different matter. Basically, there are two ways to go about the problem. The first 
is that people stay aware of human interference, whether they see a roboteer handle a 
remotely controlled machine or suspect a human coder behind the AI. After Computer-
Mediated Communication (CMC), where people are aware that the medium forwards 
messages between people, I dub this mode of processing Robot-Mediated Communication 
(RMC). In RMC mode, users remain consciously aware of the robot as a communication 
device between humans and this is where CMC theses directly apply (cf. telepresence or 
Second Life). 
The second mode of processing I call Human-Robot Communication (HRC). In HRC mode, 
users are unaware of the human behind the system. They treat the robot as if it were a human 
communication partner, irrespective of its technical design (remote control, AI, or WOz). 
Obviously, it is more likely that RMC coincides with remote-controlled robots and HRC with 
AI-driven machines but it is also possible that hybrid experiences occur, where occasionally, 
the user perceives the robot as a technical medium as well as an autonomous social actor 
(Hoorn et al., 2015). Hence, if people do assume a human being behind the AI, they are in 
RMC mode. If people (rightfully or not) do not assume a person behind the machine (not 
even a coder), they are in HRC mode. The main question, then, is whether users believe they 
talk to a human-made program or to an autonomous social actor. 
At face value, it may seem that remote-controlled robots and WOz are outdated approaches 
and that the RMC mode of processing soon will become obsolete. This seems so because 
robot manufactures and implementers make people believe that their machines have perhaps 
not sentient but at least autonomous AI. However, the opposite is true. Most robots have little 
AI and lots of remote control. Moreover, it is not so much about the technology as it is about 
what people believe about the technology. If people are aware of the human origin of a full-
blown AI, RMC is still in place. 
Synthetic Review 
Robots miss a number of human characteristics in their communication. In terms of CMC, 
cues to face-to-face (FtF) contact are filtered out from the communication of current state-of-
the-art robots, which is something the emulation paradigm tries to avoid. CMC theories deal 
differently with media that do not match human communication and in the overview of CMC 
theories offered next, they are roughly divided into two sets: Extent of Cues and Adaptation 
to Cues. 
Extent of Cues focuses on what is missing out from (mainly text-based) media as compared 
to FtF communication. I will discuss Social Presence Theory (e.g., Short, Williams, & 
Christie, 1976; Rice, 1993), Missing Social Context Cues (e.g., Sproull & Kiesler, 1986), 
Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1992), Signaling 
Theory (Donath, 2007), and Warranting (e.g., Walther, Van der Heide, Hamel, & Shulman, 
2009) for cues that are filtered out. Adaptation to Cues is directed at what people do to make 
up for missing cues: Electronic Propinquity Theory (Korzenny, 1978), Social Information 
Processing (e.g., Walther, 1992), Media Richness Theory (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1984), Social 
Influence Theory (e.g., Fulk, Schmidt, & Steinfield, 1990), Channel Expansion Theory (e.g., 
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Carlson & Zmud, 1999), and Hyperpersonal CMC (Walther, 1996; 2007). Table 1 compiles 
the basic principles of the theories followed by a discussion of their applicability to robot 
communication. 
Cues-filtered-out from robot communication 
In CMC, communication with another human being goes through media, which is also the 
case in RMC, where a human operator drives the robot and texts are typed in on the spot. In 
RMC, CMC theses should apply straightforwardly. In HRC, however, people humanize the 
medium and take the robot for an autonomous social actor, which is an issue CMC does not 
address. In those cases, I will rely on theories of M. Next, the first stream of CMC theories 
that I discuss focuses on the Extent of Cues. 
Social Presence Theory (e.g., Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976; Rice, 1993) is one of the 
early approaches to CMC and focused on cues that are filtered out from FtF communications 
(i.e. Culnan & Markus, 1987; Kiesler & Sproull, 1992). Cues-filtered-out theories state that 
(text-based) media have fewer means to convey non-verbal messages, deteriorating the 
quality of the communication. During a teleconference, for instance, fewer social and 
affective cues would supposedly diminish feelings of involvement and friendliness towards 
the conversation partner. 
In Table 1 (Extent of Cues), the consequences of these considerations are tabulated: Adverse 
effects of cues-filtered-out may be experienced with some technical aspects of robot 
communication: Poor natural-language processing, weak speech engines, and imperfect 
intonation may make a robot less understandable. Yet, people also may fear dehumanization 
of emotionally sensitive tasks. Think of care and education. Because robots lack empathy and 
other human qualities, they would not be fit to the job (cf. Sharkey & Sharkey, 2012). In 
RMC, users may feel shed off because ‘that person behind the robot is not talking to them 
personally.’ 
It also depends on the kind of robot one encounters. A Nao machine or a DARwIn-OP with a 
fixed plastic head and machine appearance has less expressiveness than Alice R50 or Milo 
R25, which have flexible faces and human-like appearance. For RMC, then, it depends on the 
machine. Even Nao has more expression possibilities (e.g., hand gestures, gaze) than texting.  
In HRC, on the assumption that no human communicator handles the machine, not all cues 
that are filtered out evoke negative effects because people expect less communicative 
skillfulness from a robot. In HRC, empathy and human interference may not always be 
wanted. Sometimes, distancing effects are appreciated (Table 1). For example, people may 
prefer neutral treatment to empathy or sympathy (e.g., when being washed by a caretaker). 
Participants preferred the delivery of bad-health news by a robot to the delivery by a human 
doctor (Hoorn & Winter, 2017). Weaker students benefitted more from a non-expressive 
robot tutor than a more expressive robot, because the latter distracted them from the contents 
(Konijn, Hoorn, & Zarchin, 2017). If what is filtered out are undesired qualities, robots may 
be appreciated more than humans despite the robot’s communicative deficiencies. The 
absence of disapproval may in fact enhance the robot’s source credibility. 
Missing Social Context Cues (e.g., Sproull & Kiesler, 1986) posits that cues filtered out lead 
to disinhibition, causing a variety of negative effects. People would become uninhibited, 
normless, self-centered, conflict oriented, and negatively biased. In ethical discussions on 
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applying robots to empathetic tasks (e.g., nursing, teaching) similar worries can be observed 
(Table 1).  
With respect to RMC, for example, Whitby (2012, p. 238) fears that people will mistrust 
those who want to replace human interaction by machines. Unethical application of robots 
could easily damage human freedom and dignity (Whitby, 2012, p. 245). Allen and Wallach 
(2012, p. 55) suspect a possible “abdication of human responsibility.” 
In HRC, Whitby (2012, p. 238) has moral reservations against intimate robot companionship, 
which would cause considerable psychological damage. Partnering with a robot would reduce 
human contact, increase social isolation, and make people do things to it that are 
unacceptable to do to humans (i.e. normless behavior). In anticipating extreme levels of 
violence against robots (Whitby, 2012, p. 240), certain authors plead for robot rights (Spatola 
& Urbanska, 2018). 
Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (e.g., Lea & Spears, 1992) assumes that 
when a communicator cannot see the other person or that person is anonymous, people lose a 
sense of awareness of self and others. Loss of individuality would shift focus towards the 
identity of the ingroup and the salience of group norms, responding to others according to 
prevalent ingroup norms (stereotyping, prejudice) rather than someone’s personal opinions 
and attitudes. One might add that open debate and positive group goals also may be a result 
but that is not the focus of such theorizing.  
With respect to robots (Table 1), people would comply more with ingroup norms in RMC 
mode than FtF. The remote-controlled robot would anonymize the human communication 
partners. For instance, the remote operator would be seen as anonymous, which may invoke 
some kind of projected social identity. If a nurse at the ward handles more remote machines 
placed in people’s homes, they may feel they are addressed as a group rather than an 
individual (all the more if group identity is made salient such as a care robot specifically 
designed for ‘older adults,’ cf. stigmatizing). 
In HRC mode, there is no person behind the robot assumed but the robot self is the 
conversation partner. In HRC, the robot is not supposed to belong to some social group, not 
to have personal judgments: It is neutral. Therefore, ‘deindividuation’ of sender or receiver 
does not lead to conformity to an ingroup. In HRC, the human (designer/programmer) behind 
the robot is forgotten and users are not aware of the mediated nature of the interaction any 
more (Hoorn et al., 2015). This may count as a loss of awareness of the other; of the human 
communicator that is. However, the robot itself is seen as the sender so deindividuation of the 
communication partner perceptually does not occur. While not talking to another human 
being but to a social actor that emits just enough human-like cues, the user becomes off 
guard. This may count as a loss of awareness of self. Yet, the consequence is not feeling 
dehumanized; in fact, the anonymity leads to self-disclosure (Hoorn et al., 2015). In HRC, 
users tend to treat the robot as a social being of its own (Hoorn et al., 2015). Psychologically, 
deindividuation in the CMC sense probably does not occur in HRC (Table 1). 
The HRI literature reports plenty examples of robots perceived as group members. For 
example, when robots are placed in human-robot teams and group membership is explicitly 
cued and asked for, people commence social categorizations of robots (Eyssel & 
Kuchenbrandt, 2012). Robots can be made part of the ingroup or outgroup when explicitly 
programmed as such or when competing human-robot teams are deliberately set up (e.g., 
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Correia, Mascarenhas, Prada, Melo, & Paiva, 2018). In aggressive tasks, ingroup robots are 
favoured even over outgroup humans (Fraune, Šabanović, & Smith, 2017). Rau, Li, and Liu 
(2013), however, manipulated aspects of group membership that were irrelevant to the task or 
clearly fictitious. In a marine survival task, the robot was said to come from the 
same/different university as the user. In such cases of irrelevance and fabrication, effects of 
group membership were not significant. 
Different from my theorizing, however, the HRI work on human-robot teams makes 
membership unambiguously salient and relevant to a competing, survival, or aggressive task. 
The situation I theorize about is different in that in an unforced and harmonious non-group 
but one-to-one situation the medium itself may exert social categorizations; in RMC rather 
than in HRC mode. 
Signaling Theory (Donath, 2007) and Warranting (e.g., Walther, Van der Heide, Hamel, & 
Shulman, 2009) are concerned with the reliability and sincerity of the signals communicators 
transmit. Central concerns are honesty of communication as opposed to deception. People do 
not care too much about small insincerities in a simple conversation (“How nice of you to 
write”) but in, for instance, financial transactions (cf. eBay) people ask for warranties 
(Donath, 2007). Assessment signals, which are directly accessible, are seen as more reliable 
than conventional signals, which are more abstract and symbolic. That a conversation partner 
has a paralyzed face (assessment signal) explains why s/he does not smile; that s/he says s/he 
is stressed out (conventional signal) may need more validation. Because on social media, 
people can assume another personality and pretend to have all kinds of qualities, 
“warranting” or fact-checking is highly relevant (e.g., Walther, Van der Heide, Hamel, & 
Shulman, 2009). However, many people do not feel that they have to check with other 
sources whether the personality performed online matches with the person offline. 
These points may remain in RMC. Assessment signals in current social robots mainly 
(willingly or not) cue the communicative incompetence of robots (unnatural speech, poor 
language understanding, clumsy movements), which may make them seem not only 
incompetent but also harmless. However, the robot may be used for a song or a dance 
whereas the unobserved person behind the machine may ridicule the entertained user. With 
the advance of IoT and data-mining techniques, the robot may be used to spy upon people, to 
phish for log-in codes, or it is used for direct-marketing purposes (cf. My Friend Cayla, the 
market-intelligence doll for kids) (Inge, July 2017). In RMC, conventional signals should be 
checked to warrant the credibility of the robot’s human driver (Table 1). 
In HRC, this may be different. Perhaps mistakenly and this may change while users gain 
experience, but from my personal observations so far people usually assume that what you 
see is what you get; that robots in being non-human do not deceive. Because seemingly there 
is no person behind the machine, what I observe is that robots raise little mistrust in HRC 
mode. Hence, users may feel little need for warranting. Buhlmann and Gisler (2006) 
indicated that an audience forgives communicative inability if a public speaker is regarded 
trustworthy (ethics high). Meta-analysis of trust in robots revealed that robot performance 
itself affected trust more than characteristics of the environment or the user (Hancock et al., 
2011). Robot designers sometimes even ‘filter in’ disclaimer features (“So sorry, I’m but a 
robot…”) to manage the user expectations (Table 1). 
On an ethical note, not all deception (whether RMC or HRC) is perceived as bad. The context 
of use is decisive. Insincerity and deception may be highly appreciated in arts, performance, 
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and entertainment but also in security and policing. Lee, Šabanović, and Stolterman (2016) 
found that participants regarded human-like robots as highly useful to ward off burglars by 
suggesting they were home. Terre des Hommes commissioned advertising bureau Havas 
Lemz to create the life-like avatar Sweetie, which impersonated a 10-year-old Filipino girl to 
capture thousands of pedophiles (Crawford, November, 2013). 
User adaptation to cues-filtered-out from robot communication 
The second stream of CMC theories I term Adaptation to Cues. These theories look into the 
ways people adjust their communications to repair the shortcomings or exploit the advantages 
of not facing the human communication partner. 
Electronic Propinquity Theory (Korzenny, 1978), for example, proposes that although people 
may be far apart physically, they may feel close by emotionally; as if they were in the room 
(cf. ‘social presence’). Part of Propinquity Theory emphasizes the scarcity of communication 
channels: The fewer options, the more important the remaining channel. If the number of 
communication possibilities decreases, the feeling of closeness becomes stronger through the 
remaining medium (Korzenny, 1978, p. 11). For instance, without electronic media, writing 
postcards gains importance and establishes more ‘relationship’ than it did before. People 
adapt their communications to the ‘remaining medium’ to optimize adequacy and 
pleasantness. 
If a robot is the only medium left to keep in contact with others, in RMC, the feeling of 
closeness to the human sender may increase as well as the inclination to adapt the 
communication to the robot’s capabilities (Table 1). This effect may be so strong that initial 
RMC becomes HRC and not just the sender but the robot itself feels close; particularly for 
people who feel lonely (e.g., Eyssel & Reich, 2013). This is perceptual. Because people feel 
lonely and the remote-controlled robot is the only contact to others, warm feelings are 
transferred to the robot. As a result, communications will be adapted to the robot so to make 
it more adequate and pleasing as a conversation device (Table 1). 
Social Information Processing (e.g., Walther, 1992) supposes that what may be lost in CMC 
is compensated over time. People compensate for cues-filtered-out with means that the 
medium does offer (e.g., insert an emoticon in a text). In doing so, CMC users bring their 
communications to the level of FtF interaction with, for instance, portrait pictures and 
personal profiles. Social Information Processing states that sometimes CMC takes more time 
to gather the same amount of information as people do offline but the net results will be the 
same in terms of richness of communication, interpersonal relationship, or the quality of the 
social interaction (e.g., Derks, Bos, & Von Grumbkow, 2008). 
In RMC and HRC, compensation for cues-filtered-out may be to let the robot sing, dance, or 
play a game. The robot might present itself on Facebook (Mavridis, et al., 2009) with 
background information (“I was designed by…”) and robot selfies (e.g., camera eyes taking 
portrait pictures in the mirror) (Figure 1). In being richer media than avatars or other CMC, 
from a Social Information Processing perspective, the speed of image building and making 
friends with a robot driver (RMC) or with the robot (HRC) should be higher (Table 1). 
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Figure 1: Mock-up of a Facebook page for robot friend Alice. 
Media Richness Theory (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1984) emphasizes that a medium is most 
effective when it fits its task and context. Each medium has its own way of resolving 
ambiguity and improving interpretation. There supposedly is a hierarchy in richness of 
communication from FtF, smartphone, email, letters, notes, to fliers and leaflets. The richness 
lies in the medium’s personal focus, number of different cues (e.g., non-verbal 
communication), immediate feedback, and natural language use. 
Of all media, social robots come closest to FtF contact in terms of media richness. There is 
turn-taking and synchronicity in interaction, the machine uses natural language, there are 
more social cues available (e.g., touching the robot), and the communication can be 
personalized (e.g., more extraverted vs introverted, see Lee, Peng, Jin, & Yan, 2006). 
As Media Richness proposes, in RMC, it depends on the task and context whether 
communication is served by putting a robot in between two people. One can think of 
situations where it works better than without. For instance, a robot may be conducive in 
teaching autistic children what facial expressions mean emotionally (e.g., Boucenna, et al. 
2014). However, Lee, Šabanović, and Stolterman (2016) observed that their participants were 
rather scared by a remote-controlled robot that looked like a real person (cf. FtF). These 
people thought the life-like robot was useful only to ward off intruders. 
For HRC, it probably means that improved natural-language processing, more personal focus, 
more social cues, and immediate feedback make robots richer communication partners and 
hence, more effective communicators (cf. De Greeff & Belpaeme, 2015; Rudovic, Lee, Dai, 
Schuller, & Picard, 2018). As Media Richness states, however, there may be an optimum to 
human-likeness, which may differ in every context of use (Broadbent et al., 2012) and for 
different user groups. Cues-filtered-out may improve communication if those cues pertain to 
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undesired human qualities such as display of superiority or tactless remarks about race and 
gender (Table 1). 
Social Influence Theory (e.g., Fulk, Schmidt, & Steinfield, 1990) asserts that apart from cues 
offered by the media, social influence is a communication process in which people rely on 
significant others to understand what a medium is about in lack of personal experience. 
Family and close friends are more important for such concept formation than less significant 
others. From that, social construction of technology may follow, where people negotiate 
among themselves what a medium is for and how to use it. For example, Instagram began as 
a photo-editing app but evolved quickly into a social network for lifestyle; Twitter today is 
used as a political instrument although it was never meant that way. Different groups may 
create different social constructs. 
Applied to robots, inexperienced users rely on family and friends to know what a social robot 
is for: Commonly, people accept robots for household chores but not for emotional care. 
Others do not mind to let robots help autistic children (e.g., Coeckelbergh et al., 2016). In 
other words, different groups create different social constructs around robots; about what you 
can do with them (their affordances) and what they are allowed to do (their ethical 
boundaries). 
In RMC, the robot is probably conceptualized as an assistive instrument of the sender such as 
a telephone. Therefore, the use of robots in certain domains is accepted. For example, a robot 
may be used by the physical therapist to demonstrate exercises to older adults. Or it may call 
out the numbers during a bingo evening. In HRC, people may fear the robot’s autonomy, 
probably more so when robots are connected to Cloud and IoT. Societal debates concern 
ethical and occupational issues (‘robots taking over’) (e.g., Broadbent et al., 2012). 
Oversimplifications of what a robot is or can do tend to vanish the more experienced a user 
becomes (cf. Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003) (Table 1). 
Additionally, Channel Expansion Theory (e.g., Carlson & Zmud, 1999) focuses on 
experience: with the channel, the topic of the message, context, and CMC partner. While 
gaining experience, people start to know better how to interpret and transmit affect-laden 
messages, which expands the expressiveness of the novel medium. 
Over time, then, the sender in RMC should become a more expressive roboteer (Table 1). For 
instance, s/he will know better which sentence constructions the speech engine pronounces 
well and which not. The roboteer will have a better feeling for the timing of the movements, 
for example, when to place a high-five or ‘dab.’ Additionally, communication improves when 
roboteer and user become better acquainted. 
With experience, technology acceptance grows (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). If 
learning systems are implemented that adapt robot behaviors to user preferences and the 
robot expresses itself accordingly, then, a growing perception of communication possibilities 
may explain why over time people start to accept the robot as a ‘normal’ conversation 
partner. In HRC, getting to know the expression possibilities of the medium also is to get to 
know the conversation partner better. In HRC, effort that is put into the medium does not 
have to be invested in the sender as is the case in RMC. In that sense, HRC is 
communicatively (and possibly affectively) more cost-effective than RMC (Table 1). 
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Hyperpersonal CMC (Walther, 1996; 2007) emphasizes that CMC sometimes outperforms 
FtF communications. At times, appeal, confidence, and awareness in CMC are higher than in 
FtF. These idealizations and overestimations of a distant other (e.g., pen pals or holiday 
flings) are projections and attributions by the message receiver. Hyperpersonal CMC concurs 
with Signaling Theory in that senders may portray themselves overly positive, hiding their 
imperfections (cf. enhanced and retouched snapshots). 
Particularly in asynchronous media (e.g., email, texting), communicators can edit, rephrase, 
or check the ‘delay delivery’ box so to optimize their messages before sending. 
Hyperpersonal CMC calls these channel effects. Work that goes into fine-tuning the text does 
not have to be invested in gestures and facial expressions. Hyperpersonal CMC follows the 
behavioral confirmation hypothesis (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) with regard to the 
feedback communicators provide. Particularly when people are unacquainted, users of CMC 
attempt to live up to the positive expectations of the other. For example, if someone has an 
idealized image of a holiday love across the ocean, that person will try to amplify the 
qualities s/he was attributed so to confirm the positivity bias of the admirer. It goes even so 
far that if people think, based on a fake photo, that an unknown other is pretty and responds 
accordingly with compliments, the flattered person shows increased self-conscious behavior 
during conversation (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977). In anticipation of negative 
responses of a communication partner, there is evidence for behavioral disconfirmation as 
well (Walther, 2007). People may start to flatter and compliment a discontented receiver to 
positively influence his or her mood. 
CMC users may also employ complementary communication channels to convey a message 
(Stephens, 2007). An email may be followed up by a text message, while sending a hand-
written letter thereafter. A sequence of messages sent over different channels would be more 
effective than one single message or using the same channel repeatedly (e.g., a barrage of 
emails). 
If in RMC, the distant other is represented by a robot (cf. teleconferencing), it might be that 
the sender at one point is attributed positive qualities (e.g., nice person, technically gifted) 
because the robot seems friendly and helpful while the sender may confirm those qualities by 
letting the robot say so (Table 1). Or the robot could be used to praise and compliment a 
receiver that is unhappy about the faulty communication. Yet, communication is not 
asynchronous in RMC. It may be hard then to repair miscommunication. On the one hand, a 
human is assumed as sender but on the other hand, time has to be invested in the robot’s 
gestures and facial expressions. An extra communication channel may be helpful here, such 
as a robot with a tablet on its chest to show pictures and clips (cf. SoftBank’s Pepper). 
When it comes to the possibilities of what Hyperpersonal CMC calls channel effects, 
communication with robots in HRC resembles FtF interaction more than other CMC. Here 
also, the communication is almost immediate, dyadic, but not as fast as with humans. By this 
I mean that communication between two able humans is way faster and can achieve a speed 
of interaction impossible to achieve between an able human and the best of current robotics. 
But different from RMC, users can take their time in saying things the way they want: They 
can stammer, repair, and are not judged for being slow or when things come out the wrong 
way. In HRC, there is no time pressure on dividing attention among communication tasks 
(e.g., proper speech), functional tasks (e.g., looking up information), and maintaining the 
interpersonal relationship (e.g., being polite). Moreover, the feedback a robot provides in 
HRC can always be positive irrespective of a user’s bad mood (Table 1). 
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In view of these channel and feedback effects, people sometimes think that robots do a better 
job than humans do (e.g., Satake, Hayashi, Nakatani, & Kanda, 2015). Because no human 
sender is assumed in HRC, there seems to be a floor effect, whereas human-human 
interaction hits a ceiling of expectations. People expect a lot of care and consideration from 
their fellow humans, who may not always be able to deliver. From humans, we hope and 
expect that they are great communicators (‘performance over par’), which actually increases 
the likelihood that they fail. In facing an increased risk to fail and not living up to 
expectations, sometimes humans may seem to be more disappointing than certain robots with 
their advantageous channel and feedback effects. From robots, we expect little (‘performance 
under par’) and hope for something better but if not, there is no harm done. Given the lower 
standards for robots, they sometimes are more likely to succeed as communicators than 
humans (Table 1). 
In turn, the surprise of a disproven floor effect may lead to overestimation of the robot’s 
competencies (‘he listens to me’) despite evident failures. People need but little stimulus to 
make great overattributions (cf. Ellison, Heino, & Gibb, 2006). Perhaps this explains 
unwarranted conclusions that robots (potentially) are more moral, decent, attentive, 
intelligent, etc. (cf. Kurzweil, 2014). Perhaps that futuristic visions of a robot utopia and the 
dawning of ‘the singularity’ are instances of Hyperpersonal HRC. 
Results and Discussion 
Overview of CMC for robotics 
There is missing communication theory on robots as a medium and how robots might fit into 
the ‘bigger picture’ of CMC theory. Such theory may serve as a springboard for new lines of 
research, which are germane once robots become our intermediaries in the IoT and Cloud. In 
the previous, I have attempted to describe where CMC-theory extensions matter for the 
different forms of robot communication and how robots may depart from the functionalities 
of more conventional CMC. Remote-controlled robots, Wizard of Oz, and AI-driven robots 
may be perceived as RMC or HRC. Sometimes, people may switch back and forth between 
RMC and HRC, which will be discussed in Hoorn (2018a). Table 1 presents an overview of 
the various forms of social robotics in relation to CMC and FtF on the dimensions raised by 
the CMC theories reviewed. 
In column 1 of Table 1, the names of the CMC theories are mentioned. Column 2 provides 
the tenets of each theory. Column 3 is split into two, based on the awareness of the user of 
another human being that drives the robot. If aware of the human conversation partner, RMC 
follows basically the CMC theses. If people are unaware of the human communicator or 
software designer, HRC departs from CMC because now the medium itself has become the 
communication partner. Note that perceptually it may be so that a remote-controlled robot is 
taken for an autonomous machine and that HRC commences. Reversely, users may suspect 
that an AI machine is steered by a human being, so that RMC hypotheses are in place.  
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Table 1: CMC in Social Robotics (Remote-controlled, Wizard of Oz, AI-driven). 
Theories of CMC CMC theses Awareness of human source? 
Yes 
RMC follows CMC 
No 
HRC 
Extent of Cues    
 
Social Presence 
Theory 
 
Cues filtered out from FtF 
damage communication. 
 
Flaws in robot communication (e.g., 
pronunciation, intonation) reduce 
comprehensibility. People may fear 
dehumanization because robots would 
lack empathy and other human 
qualities. Users may feel disgruntled 
because the sender is not addressing 
them directly. Yet, certain robots have 
more expression possibilities than 
other so that the ‘damage’ differs. 
 
 
Not all cues filtered out necessarily 
evoke negative effects. The absence of 
judgment and other negative human 
qualities may enhance the robot’s source 
credibility. Empathy and human inter-
ference are not necessarily wanted in 
each situation. Distance and neutrality 
may be appreciated as well. Emotional 
expression may distract from task and 
content matters. 
Missing Social 
Context Cues 
Cues-filtered-out lead to 
disinhibition, normless-
ness, being self-centered, 
conflict oriented, and to a 
negative mood. 
Possible mistrust against those who 
want to employ robots for 
communication and interaction. 
Possible damage to human freedom 
and dignity, not taking personal 
responsibility. 
 
 
Intimate robot companionship may 
reduce human contact, increase social 
isolation, and invite normless behaviors 
(e.g., extreme violence). Plea for robot 
legal rights. 
Social Identity 
Model of 
Deindividuation 
Effects 
Deindividuation and 
anonymity cause loss of 
awareness of self and 
others. Compliance with 
(salient) ingroup norms. 
Effect on relation with person behind 
the robot depends on group 
identification and salience of group 
norms. When communicating via a 
robot, users may feel they are not 
communicating as individuals but as a 
group representative. Ergo, they 
comply with ingroup norms.  
Robot supposedly does not belong to a 
social group; has no personal judgments. 
Thus, ‘deindividuation’ of the sender 
does not lead to ingroup behaviors of the 
user. In fact, deindividuation does not 
occur at all because the robot itself is 
taken for an individual. That the human 
behind the robot is forgotten, is a loss of 
Hoorn, J. F. (2018). Theory of robot communication: I. The medium is the communication partner. arXiv:cs, 2502565(v1), 1-21.  14 
 
 
awareness of the other. Anonymity may 
lead to loss of awareness of self but also 
to self-disclosure. 
 
Signaling Theory / 
Warranting 
Communication potentially 
is unreliable, insincere, 
dishonest, and deceptive. 
Remedies are to evaluate 
signals (assessment, 
conventional) and fact-
checking. 
Most assessment signals cue 
communicative incompetence and so 
robots seem harmless. Deception may 
occur in cases of fraud, spying, and 
gathering user information. Checking 
the robot’s conventional signals is 
necessary to evaluate the credibility of 
the human driver. 
 
People assume that in being non-human, 
robots do not deceive so that users 
assume warranting is unneeded. Robot’s 
poor communication is compensated by 
assumed source credibility. Disclaimer 
features manage user expectations. 
Deception is acceptable for 
entertainment or to prevent crime. 
 
Adaptation to Cues    
 
Electronic 
Propinquity Theory 
 
When out of options, the 
remaining medium feels 
closer, suggests more rela-
tionship. Communication is 
adapted to remaining 
medium 
 
If robots are the remaining medium, 
closeness to the human sender, the 
feeling of relationship with the sender, 
and the inclination to adapt the 
communication may increase. 
 
The robot itself feels close. People feel 
in a relationship with the machine. This 
may be stronger for lonely and socially 
isolated people. Communications are 
adapted to make the robot a proficient 
and pleasing conversation partner. 
 
Social Information 
Processing 
Information that may be 
lost by cues filtered out is 
compensated over time by 
other means of the medium 
up to FtF level. 
The sender may compensate robot 
communicative shortcomings by 
letting it sing, dance, or play a game. 
Becoming friends with the roboteer 
should be faster than via other CMC. 
Compensation may be achieved by extra 
functionality such as automatic inform-
ation retrieval and verbalization but also 
by using social media (the robot may 
send a text message). 
 
Media Richness 
Theory 
FtF is the richest form of 
communication. Yet, it 
depends on task and 
context, whether more cues 
to FtF improve 
Dependent on task and context, a 
robot as mediator of the 
communication between people may 
exert positive effects. Social robots 
come closest to FtF in terms of turn-
To make robots richer communication 
partners and more effective communi-
cators, natural language processing, 
personal focus, social cues, and 
immediate feedback should improve. 
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communication. taking, synchronicity, natural 
language, touch, personalization, etc. 
Yet, there may exist an optimum to 
human-likeness, dependent of use 
context and user groups. Cues-filtered-
out may improve communication if cues 
to humanness are undesired. 
 
Social Influence 
Theory 
People rely on significant 
others what the medium is 
about and how to use it.
  
Inexperienced users rely on family and 
friends to know what a social robot is 
for. Different groups may create dif-
ferent social constructs. The robot is 
probably conceptualized as an extens-
ion of the communicator and accepted 
in certain domains but not in other. 
 
People fear autonomous machines. 
Societal debates concern ethical and 
occupational issues. People think that 
general-purpose machines are developed 
for one single task or user group. Over-
simplifications subside with experience. 
Channel Expansion 
Theory 
People learn to handle 
media to increase express-
iveness. Communication 
improves with more 
knowledge about the 
conversation partner. 
Sender learns how to be a more 
expressive roboteer (e.g., sentence 
constructions, timing of movements). 
Communication improves when 
sender and receiver become better 
acquainted. 
With experience, technology acceptance 
grows. If systems are applied that adapt 
robot behaviors to user preferences, 
people accept the robot as a ‘normal’ 
partner. Because the medium is the 
conversation partner, learning about 
expression possibilities is knowing the 
conversation partner better, which is 
more effort-efficient than CMC/RMC. 
 
Hyperpersonal 
CMC 
The distant other is ideali-
zed. Overestimations, pro-
jections, attributions of 
high appeal and attractive-
ness occur frequently. 
Asynchronous messages 
can be fine-tuned before 
sending (channel effects). 
Feedback tailored to the 
Receiver attributes positive qualities 
to sender because the robot behaves 
nicely. Sender may use the robot to 
confirm those perceptions or to dis-
confirm an unhappy receiver. RMC is 
not asynchronous and communicative 
repairs may be hard to execute for the 
human sender. More time, then, has to 
be invested in the robot’s gestures and 
Re channel effects, HRC resembles FtF 
more than other CMC. Communication 
is immediate, dyadic, but slower than 
FtF. Robots do not judge, so people have 
ample time for repair. Robot feedback 
can always be positive. These en-
couraging effects make people think that 
robots can outperform humans. People 
expect more from one another than from 
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receiver via behavioral 
(dis)confirmation. More 
media may be used for 
message effectiveness. 
expressions (e.g., sorry face). Extra 
communication channels (display, 
texting) may increase effectiveness. 
robots so that eventually robots may be 
surprising and humans disappointing. 
Overestimations of robot’s competencies 
may instill visions of superior AI. 
 
Note. The first four theories envision FtF as the ideal; the other theories emphasize user adaptation and contingency.
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CMC seems most informative for social robotics, particularly in RMC mode. Owing to the 
physical presence of the robot, however, not every aspect of CMC applies. For HRC as well, 
CMC is still useful as a springboard to novel theory. The big difference with CMC and RMC 
is that in HRC, the user is not aware of the human sender anymore (the roboteer, the software 
designer). During an interaction, users may switch between the two levels of awareness so 
that actual RMC may be (temporarily) experienced as HRC and vice versa. 
In looking at the Extent of Cues theories of CMC in Table 1 and how they play out in RMC, 
robots may have a number of drawbacks in communication. Because in robots, a number of 
cues to FtF communication are filtered out, there may be difficulties in comprehensibility. 
Dependent of the expression possibilities of the robot, the communication may feel 
impersonal, without much empathy, while group norms prevail at the cost of communicating 
individual perspectives. There is a potential danger of spying on others. The communicative 
incapacity of the robot (e.g., it cannot blush) may hide the true intentions of the human 
sender/roboteer when s/he tells a lie. Warranting may be vital but will not be performed 
quickly. 
From the CMC theories that emphasize communicative adaptability, the conclusion may be 
drawn that when RMC forms the only connection to the outside world, feelings of closeness 
to the human sender increase. When users are inexperienced, they will rely on significant 
peers to know how to conceive of the robot as a medium and how to use it. Time will be 
invested to adapt communication to the limitations of the robot but also to exploit the things 
it does offer (e.g., a game, a dance). Because social robots come closer to FtF than other 
CMC, (e.g., gestures, eye contact), communication probably is more effective although there 
may be contingency effects. Yet, communicative repair is harder because the interaction is 
not asynchronous. The way the robot behaves may be transferred to its sender, making the 
receiver attribute all kinds of qualities to the sender that may be non-existent. 
In HRC, the medium is source and messenger. The robot is conceptualized as a social actor 
of its own. Hence, deindividuation may not occur. By contrast, people may fear the robot’s 
independent decisions and become concerned with ethical and occupational issues. 
Overestimations of a robot’s capacities may prompt visons of singularity and superior 
intelligence. 
Missing cues to negative human behavior (e.g., not showing disdain) may increase the source 
credibility of the robot as a communication partner, making it a benevolent social partner 
irrespective of its communicative flaws. Disclaimer features that are filtered in enhance the 
effect of being apologized for poor performance. Users are not inclined to check the facts in 
the robot’s communications. Dependent of the context of use, positive human qualities such 
as empathy may not always be appreciated (e.g., during instruction) and seemingly negative 
qualities such as detachment may be desired in certain situations (e.g., where professional 
distance is required). Deception and other supposedly negative qualities are acceptable 
whenever they serve a user’s interest, for instance, for entertainment purposes, learning, as 
placebo, or for protection.  
With respect to communicative adaptation in HRC, Table 1 shows that communication is 
adapted to the robot’s possibilities. Compensation comes from features the robot does have, 
for instance, calendar keeping or exercising. The robot also may use social media as an extra. 
Human-likeness is appreciated for basic communication technicalities such as natural-
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language processing but finds its limitations in the context of use: Too human-like may 
become uncanny (cf. Stein & Ohler, 2017). 
With experience and experimentation, appropriation and domestication, acceptance of the 
robot as a normal communication partner grows (e.g., De Graaf, Ben Allouch, & Klamer, 
2015). The lonelier and socially isolated people are, the closer the robot may feel as ‘a 
person.’ To become acquainted with a robot costs less effort than other CMC because 
knowing the medium is to know the conversation partner. If programmed well, robots are 
patient with communicative flaws of the user and always provide positive feedback. People 
have higher expectations of other people than of robots so that robots easily please compared 
to humans. 
Conclusions 
With the advent of Cloud computing and embedded software, social robots may likely 
become the universal interface between the digital and the analogue world (Hoorn, 2018b). 
Research into human-robot communication should address a number of topics that further its 
basic theory and that could underpin its general design. Next I draw three conclusions and 
raise some related research challenges: 
1) Human-human relationships are not always ideal or preferred. Obviously, the point is to 
demarcate to which degree a robot should simulate human behaviors and where it starts to 
deteriorate communication. Cues filtered out from FtF do not have to be detrimental; filtering 
out negative cues may improve communication. Additionally, certain cues filtered in may 
enhance communication. Disclaimer features may serve as assessment cues to signal non-
human behavior and communicative incompetence, which may lower expectations. 
Countering anticipated floor effects may positively surprise a robot’s users. 
2) A robot is a social actor of its own, not another human, animal, plant, or conventional 
computer. Social robots complement rather than replace human beings. Perhaps we should 
celebrate the differences (cf. “the value of difference,” Sandry, 2015, p. 114). Here, the issue 
is what position a robot will take socially. Do we ‘mindlessly’ apply human social rules and 
norms in dealing with them (Nass & Moon, 2000) or do we treat them not as if they were 
human but as a social entity of its own, applying different rules and norms? What social role 
(a novice, expert, child, adult) should the robot play in which setting to improve 
communication and what differences to human behaviors are conducive to communication? 
Context of use determines the positive or negative effects on communication of cues filtered 
in or out. For instance, the uncanniness of a human-like robot may be appreciated in 
entertainment or in security tasks but not in a family setting (cf. Lee, Šabanović, & 
Stolterman, 2016). 
3) The medium is the source and the messenger. People tend to take the robot itself as the 
source of communication (Gunkel, 2012), not the human driver or designer behind it. Which 
human-like qualities do people ascribe to a robot, compensating by attribution what actually 
is not there (cf. Nass & Moon, 2000)? 
As CMC moved beyond radio and TV, we should move beyond CMC if social robots are to 
become the communication interface of the future. To arrive at a theory of robot 
communication, several aspects of CMC may apply but this is dependent on the user’s 
awareness of the sender (Robot-Mediated Communication follows CMC) or not (Human-
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Robot Communication makes predictions of its own). Important insights of the current paper 
are that cues-filtered-out from FtF are not necessarily bad and that absence of negative 
qualities enhances, for instance, source credibility. Much depends on the context of use. 
Hoorn (2018a) will go deeper into the issue of awareness of the human behind the machine 
and how people may build up a relationship with what essentially is a communication 
medium. 
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